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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through DIVISION 
OF FORESTRY, FIRE & STATE LANDS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH; SIX MILE 
RANCH COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
CRAIG S. BLEAZARD, an individual; 
MARK C. BLEAZARD, an individual; and 
JOHN C. BLEAZARD, an individual. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant files this brief in reply to the responsive briefs filed by Tooele County 
and by the other appellees, collectively referred to as "the Bleazards." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the request of the Bleazards and other private landowners on Stansbury Island, 
Tooele County, by ordinance, vacated the north end of West Stansbury Road. This 
public county road had provided the general public and the State's employees and lessees 
access to State sovereign lands on and around Stansbury and Badger Islands in the Great 
Appeal No. 20000493-SC 
Priority No. 15 (Subject to 
Assignment to Court of Appeals) 
1 
Salt Lake. (R. 7-11).1 After this action was taken, the private landowners erected a 
locked gate across the southern end of the vacated portion of West Stansbury Road, 
blocking public access to the sovereign lands on and around Stansbury and Badger 
Islands. (R. 7-8; R. 163). 
The Utah Division of Forestry, Fire & State Lands, which manages those 
sovereign lands, sought to invalidate Tooele County's ordinance, claiming the county had 
not complied with the notice requirements of former section 27-12-102.4. Specifically, 
the Division complained the county had failed to give the State, as owner of sovereign 
lands abutting the portion of West Stansbury Road to be yacated, prior written notice of 
the petition to vacate and the public hearing thereon. (R. 13). The Division moved for 
summary judgment on its statutory claim. (R. 79-80). Tooele County opposed the 
motion, arguing that "[i]n 1993, the State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire & State 
Lands was not an owner of record of land abutting the road to be vacated, neither did 
their name appear on the rolls of the county assessor." (R. 117). The county disputed the 
"abutting" nature of the State's ownership by submitting the affidavit of the county 
recorder. (R. 114; attached here as Addendum 1). Additionally, the county assessor 
!In accordance with the published notice (R. 94, 107), the county ordinance (R. 82-
3; Br. of Appellant, Addendum E) vacated West Stansbury Road all the way to its 
northern terminus at the dike to Badger Island in Section 9, Township 2 North, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, not just to a point in the middle of Section 16, 
Township 2 North Range 6 West. (See Br. of Bleazards, Addendum A for section 
numbers). 
2 
stated in her affidavit that she reviewed the tax rolls, which "indicate that in 1993 the 
State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not listed as a property 
owner on Stansbury Island, neither did it have a mailing address on the rolls of the county 
assessor." (R. 113). The Bleazards also opposed the State's motion, disputing the 
abutting nature of the State's lands by reference to affidavits and maps suggesting that the 
public road, West Stansbury Road, did not extend all the way to the Great Salt Lake in 
section 9, Township 2 North, Range 6 West at its northern end, but instead terminated 
around the middle of section 16 of that township. (R. 296-307 & referenced exhibits, 
280-83, 292, 294, 333, 338; R. 355 at 26-27). 
The appellees filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the statutory 
noncompliance claim (R. 169-70), contending first that section 27-12-102.4 does not 
require written notice to abutting landowners if notice is published, as it was here (R. 
287-92, 337; R. 355 at 30-31). Second, appellees argued, even if section 27-12-102.4 
required written notice in addition to publication, the State was not among those abutting 
landowners on Stansbury Island entitled to written notice under the statute because it is 
not a tax-paying landowner whose address is listed on the rolls of the Tooele County 
Assessor (R. 284, 337; R. 355 at 20-22, 32-33; R. 355 at 18-20). 
The trial court concluded the parties had demonstrated a dispute over the material 
fact of whether the State is an abutting landowner (R. 355 at 42), precluding summary 
judgment for the State. For purposes of resolving the appellees' cross-motion for 
3 
summary judgment, however, the court was willing to view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, the State, and to assume it to be true that the State is 
an abutting landowner. 
Assuming that fact, the trial court granted summary judgment to Tooele County 
and to the Bleazards, accepting their arguments that former section 27-12-102.4 (a) does 
not require mailing of notice to abutting landowners in addition to publication and (b) 
even if it does, the State was not an abutting landowner who paid taxes and, thus, was not 
on the rolls of the Tooele County Assessor, as the statute also required. (R. 347; R. 355 at 
42; Br. of Appellant, Addendum A). The court did not rule, and was not asked to rule, 
that the State is not the "owner of record" of sovereign lands around Stansbury Island. 
(See R. 284, 337; R. 355 at 18-22). 
On appeal, Tooele County now concedes that the trial court's interpretation of 
section 27-12-102.4 is incorrect and that the former statute does indeed require notice to 
be mailed to abutting landowners as well as published. Br. of Tooele County at 7.2 The 
Bleazards, on the other hand, still maintain this interpretation of the statute is correct. Br. 
of Bleazards at 9-19. But, along with Tooele County, they also rely on the fallback 
2Tooele County also admits that, under Utah law, the State's rights of way and 
easements over West Stansbury Road as owner of public lands accessed by West 
Stansbury Road are not extinguished even if Tooele County properly vacated it as a 
public road. Br. of Tooele County at 10. The Bleazards apparently agree, Br. of 
Bleazards at 10, though they have admitted erecting a locked gate across the southern end 
of the vacated portion of West Stansbury Road, which blocks public access to the 
sovereign lands on and around Stansbury and Badger Islands. (R. 7-8; R. 163). 
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argument that they are entitled to summary judgment nonetheless because, "as a matter of 
law," the State is not an abutting landowner. Br. of Bleazards at 19-21; Br. of Tooele 
County at 5-7.3 
On appeal, Tooele County and the Bleazards have abandoned their argument 
below, accepted by Judge Young, that the State's address is not on the assessor's rolls 
and, thus, it is not entitled to mailed notice because section 27-12-102.4 was intended to 
give notice only to abutting landowners who are also taxpayers. (See R. 284, 337; R. 355 
at 20-22, 32-33; R. 355 at 18-20). Instead, the Bleazards argue, their summary judgment 
can be affirmed on the alternative ground that the State is not an owner "of record" of the 
sovereign lands at Stansbury Island below the meander line. They erroneously assert this 
is a "fact" the State "admits" in its opening brief or is established by the affidavits they 
submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment. Br. of Bleazards at 5, 20; cf. 
Br. of Appellant at 20-21. This "fact," they contend for the first time here, is why the 
3Tooele County also presents, for the first time in its appellate brief, "evidence" of 
the fact that notice of the petition was mailed to abutting landowners other than the State. 
Br. of Tooele County at 5 & Addendum B. This argument and "evidence" should be 
stricken and disregarded by the Court, first, because the "evidence" was not before the 
trial court and thus is outside the record on appeal. See Wilderness Bldg. Systems v. 
Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1985). Moreover, that record cannot be 
supplemented now by the appellee in its addendum. State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, f 7, 974 
P.2d 279. Secondly, the argument is irrelevant to the issues before this Court (as is 
Tooele County's argument regarding standing, Br. of Tooele County at 8-9) because the 
State is only asserting its own right to statutory notice as an abutting landowner, not that 
of other abutting landowners. 
5 
State's address for its lands below the Great Salt Lake meander line does not appear on 
the rolls of the Tooele County Tax Assessor. Br. of Bleazards at 20-23. Finally, based on 
this "fact," ihey appear to argue that it would be against public policy to interpret section 
27-12-102.4 as requiring mailed notice to abutting landowners who are not "owners of 
record." Br, of Bleazards at 23-25. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 27-12-102.4 REQUIRED PUBLICATION OF NOTICE 
AND MAILING OF NOTICE OF THE PETITION/HEARING TO 
ABUTTING LANDOWNERS 
A. The plain language of section 27-12-102.4. including its punctuation, requires 
notice of a petition to vacate a road to be mailed to abutting landowners as well as 
published. 
In response to Point I of Appellant's Brief, Tooele County concedes that the trial 
court erred since it agrees with Appellant that former section 27-12-102.4 "required both 
publication of the notice of public hearing and mailing of such notice to the road's 
abutting landowners." Br. of Tooele County at 7. 
The Bleazards, however, continue to maintain that the trial court correctly 
concluded that section 27-12-102.4 did not require mailed notice to abutting landowners 
if notice was published, as it was here. They do not respond on the merits to the State's 
"plain language" argument, instead claiming the State implicitly "concedes" the statute is 
ambiguous. Br. of Bleazards at 9-10. The State has made no such concession. 
In the trial court and in its opening brief, the State argued at length that the plain 
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language of the unambiguous statute in effect in 1993 when Tooele County acted to 
vacate West Stansbury Road, if construed in accordance with established principles of 
statutory interpretation, required mailing of notice to abutting landowners, whether notice 
was also published or posted. The State adheres to these arguments, which will not be 
repeated here. Several points raised by Appellees nonetheless require a response. 
First, it is true that in Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994), a 
challenge by abutting landowners to a city ordinance vacating a public roadway, the 
municipality neither published notice to the general public nor mailed notice to abutting 
landowners. But the court of appeals read Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8.4 (1999), language 
identical to that in section 27-12-102.4, as requiring both forms of notice. Nelson, 872 
P.2d at 38. This conclusion was essential to their ruling in favor of the abutting 
landowners and is not dicta. 
Second, the Bleazards again confuse an unconstitutional "taking," a matter of 
substantive due process, with a right to prior notice and opportunity to be heard before 
governmental action substantially affecting a property interest, a matter of procedural due 
process. See Br. of Bleazards at 14-15. The State does not assert a substantive due 
process claim in this action. 
Third, the Bleazards ignore controlling precedent from this Court, Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County, 437 P.2d 442, 447-48 (Utah 1968), which held that those whose properties 
are substantially affected by a municipal ordinance changing the zoning on a neighboring 
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property from residential to commercial are entitled by due process to adequate prior 
notice and opportunity to be heard. Notice by publication and posting was 
constitutionally insufficient. Id. The Bleazards nonetheless insist that abutting property 
owners have no procedural due process protections when a public road is vacated by 
governmental ordinance because that is "legislative action" to which procedural due 
process does not apply. Br. of Bleazards at 12-17. On this point, they are simply 
mistaken on the law. 
At a minimum, the federal due process clause requires that "deprivation of life, 
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (emphasis added). As the California Supreme Court recognized 
more than twenty years ago, it is "well settled" that this declaration in Mullane means 
"only those governmental decisions which are adjudicative in nature are subject to 
procedural due process principles. Legislative action is not burdened by these 
requirements." Horn v. County of Ventura, 596 P.2d 1134, 1137-38 (Cal. 1979). 
The rationale for this legislation/adjudication distinction was explained long ago 
by Justice Holmes: legislative action, including agency rule-making, does not require 
prior notice and hearing because it is general, applying "to more than a few people," 
BiMetallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915), and making it "impracticable that 
8 
everyone should have a voice in its adoption." Id* The Court concluded that a state 
agency's determination that local officials had systematically undervalued property, 
leading to an order to them to raise valuations, was legislative action. Thus, all property 
owners whose valuations were to be raised were not constitutionally entitled to notice and 
opportunity to be heard before the legislative action was taken. Id. 
In contrast, adjudications, which do require adequate notice and hearing, involve 
"a relatively small number of persons, who were exceptionally affected" by the 
government action. Id. at 446 (citing Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908)). In 
Londoner, the Court invalidated on procedural due process grounds an ordinance 
assessing the objecting, abutting landowners the costs of a road improvement because the 
city council had not provided them with notice and opportunity to be heard. 210 U.S. at 
4
 Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it 
is impracticable that everyone concerned should have a voice 
in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public 
acts to be done in town meetings or an assembly of the whole. 
General statutes within the state power are passed that affect 
the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point 
of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their 
rights are protected in the only way they can be in a complex 
society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who 
make the rule. 
BiMetallic, 239 U.S. at 445; accord County of Fairfax v. Southern Iron Works, 41 S.E.2d 
674, 679 (Va. 1991). 
385.5 In Tolman, this Court adhered to the legislation/adjudication distinction, 
necessarily concluding that a county ordinance granting a variance request and rezoning a 
piece of property was, vis a vis three neighboring property owners, an adjudication. 
Therefore, the due process clause entitled them to adequate notice and opportunity to be 
heard about their objections to the proposed action. 437 P.2d at 318. 
Action by a county vacating a public road likewise constitutes an adjudication for 
federal due process purposes, entitling landowners whose property is substantially 
affected by the proposed vacating of the public road to notice and opportunity to be heard. 
A case relied on by appellees actually supports the State on this point. In Horn, the 
California Supreme Court held that a county's grant of approval to a subdivision plan 
constituted an adjudication, not a legislative act, constitutionally entitling the affected 
neighboring landowners to notice and hearing. 596 P.2d at 1138-39. The court contrasted 
the situation to that in San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass fn v. City Council, 529 P.2d 570 
(Cal. 1974), in which it concluded that enactment of a general zoning ordinance is a 
legislative act not subject to due process requirements. On the other hand, the court 
concluded, "[subdivision approvals, like variances and conditional use permits, involve 
the application of general standards to specific parcels of real property. Such 
governmental conduct, affecting the relatively few, is 'determined by facts peculiar to the 
5In Elkins v. Millard County Drainage Distr. No. 5, 294 P. 307, 312 (Utah 1930), 
this Court noted that Londoner and numerous other cases cited for this principle "are so 
well established as to be beyond controversy." 
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individual case' and are 'adjudicatory' in nature." Horn, 596 P.2d at 1138; accord Evans 
v. Shore Communications, Inc., 685 A.2d 454, 466 (Md. App. 1996) (concluding that 
consideration of zoning variance request is adjudicatory). 
Similarly, former section 27-12-102.1 required a county that was asked to vacate 
all or part of a public road to determine both that there was good cause for vacating a 
public road and that doing so was not detrimental to the general interest. Like resolution 
of zoning variance requests, resolution of these matters involves the county 
commissioners' application of a general standard to the specific facts about a particular 
public road, the interests of a handful of abutting landowners affected if the public road 
were vacated, and the general interest in the particular road remaining a public road. As 
the California court aptly noted in the context of approval of a particular subdivision plan, 
"Resolution of these issues involves the exercise of judgment and the careful balancing of 
conflicting interests, the hallmark of the adjudicative process." Horn, 596 P.2d at 1139. 
Finally, none of the cases cited by the Bleazards bear on the question of whether 
proceedings before the county commission to vacate a public road are legislative or 
adjudicatory for purposes of procedural due process. See Br. of Bleazards at 13. In North 
Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1925), the Court called statutory 
declarations of the necessity of, and appropriate procedures for, the governmental taking 
of private property through condemnation for public use "legislative questions" not 
subject to the due process hearing requirement. But the instant case does not involve a 
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general state statute or any claim of governmental taking for public use. On the contrary, 
it involves a governmental giveaway of a particular public road to satisfy particular 
private, not public, interests, without providing the constitutionally adequate and 
statutorily mandated notice to the State, the owner of sovereign lands at which the vacated 
road dead ends. 
In Nyman v. City of Eugene, 593 P.2d 515, 521 (Ore. 1979), the court described as 
a "policy" matter the decision to widen a road onto private property, but reached no 
conclusions relevant here. Likewise, the Washington court's description of the power to 
vacate streets as a "political function," Thayer v. King County, 731 P.2d 1167, 1169 
(Wash. App. 1997), is not helpful here. 
Because the county's consideration of a private petition to vacate a public road is 
"adjudicatory" for due process purposes, the State adheres to its argument that 
interpreting section 27-12-102.4 to not require mailed notice to abutting landowners 
would render the statute vulnerable to constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court has 
articulated the general rule that emerges from Mullane: "[N]otice by publication is not 
enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known or very easily 
ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the 
proceedings in question." Schroederv. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962); 
accord Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318; City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 
U.S. 293, 296 (1953) (pointing out that "[n]otice by publication is a poor and sometimes a 
12 
hopeless substitute for actual service of notice. Its justification is difficult at best/'); 
Tolman, 437 P.2d at 447-48. 
B. The isolated, erroneous statement of the sponsor of the 1998 bill that 
comprehensively restructured and recodified the Transportation Code provides no 
reliable evidence of legislative intent in former section 27-12-102.4 not to require 
mailed notice to abutting landowners in addition to published notice. 
Because section 27-12-102.4 is unambiguous, resort to legislative history or to 
subsequent amendment of this provision is inappropriate. See Vigos v. Mountainland 
Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, f 13, 993 P.2d 207; State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 
1992). Nonetheless, as they did below, the Bleazards contend section 27-12-102.4 is 
ambiguous. They again rely on the legislature's 1998 revision of section 27-12-102.4, 
replacing it with section 72-3-108, as conclusively showing what the legislature meant in 
section 27-12-102.4. According to the Bleazards, section 27-12-1-2.4 did not require 
mailed notice to abutting landowners if notice were published because (a) the 1998 
statute, section 72-3-108, did not require mailed notice in such a circumstance, and (b) 
the bill's sponsor, Martha Dillree, assured her colleagues that the 1998 recodification did 
not change the substantive law.6 See R. 100-01, 291; Br. of Appellant at 18-19. Even if 
section 27-12-102.4 were ambiguous about whether notice must be mailed if also 
6A subsequent clarifying amendment of a statute may indicate legislative intent 
underlying an ambiguous pre-amendment provision, see, e.g., In re D.B., 925 P.2d 178, 
182 n.5 (Utah App. 1996) (citing 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 22.01 (5th ed. 1993)), but the 1998 Transportation Code Recodification 
Bill was not such an amendment. 
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published, this Court should reject Representative Dillree's statement about the 1998 
Transportation Recodification Bill as conclusive evidence of legislative intent as to the 
meaning of former section 27-12-102.4. 
As a general matter, a bill sponsor's remarks may be considered by a court 
construing a provision of a bill enacted into law, 2 A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction, § 48.14 at 473-74; § 48.15 at 475-76 (6th ed. 2000) (hereafter 
Sutherland), but they are not controlling on the question of legislative intent. See Brock 
v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986); Consumer Product Safety Comm 'n v. GTE 
Sylvaniaf Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980) (noting that "ordinarily even the 
contemporaneous remarks of a single legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in 
analyzing legislative history"). Utah case law likewise reflects the potentially 
informative, but not necessarily definitive, nature of a sponsor's view of what a bill 
means. Compare Stavros v. Office of Leg. Research & Gen 7 Counsel, 2000 UT 63, f 18, 
402 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (initiative sponsors' descriptions of its purpose accorded no weight 
if at odds with the language of the initiative itself) and State v. Kenison, 2000 UT App 
322, f 10, 14 P.3d 129 (declining to consider floor debates in construing statute) with 
Lopez v. Union Pac. RR. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 604 n.3 (Utah 1997) (citing floor debate). 
The reason is that legislative floor debates, including sponsor's statements, are at best an 
uncertain guide to statutory interpretation. See 2A Sutherland, § 48.13 at 466. In many 
cases, "[t]he 'sponsor' in fact knows no more about the bill than anyone else." Id. § 
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48.15 at 477-78; see, e.g., Day v. State, 1999 UT 46, f 48, 980 P.2d 1171 (noting that 
sponsor "misstated the actual effect of the amendment"). 
Here, Representative Dillree made a sweeping statement that her bill recodifying 
the Transportation Code made no substantive changes in the law. Remarks of Rep. 
Marda Dillree, Gen'l Session re H.B. 202, 52nd Utah Leg., Jan. 22, 1998, tape 1, side 2. 
Nonetheless, there is no question that the punctuation and structure of the two provisions 
are different. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) (requiring notice 
"by publishing . . . , o r , . . . by posting . . . , and by mailing . . . . " ) with Utah Code Ann. § 
72-3-108(2) (Supp. 1999) (notice must be "(a) published in a newspaper . . . ; or (b) 
posted . . . and . . . mailed to all owners of property abutting the county road") (amended 
2000). That difference, never brought to the attention of legislators in 1998, leads to a 
different substantive result:7 under section 27-12-102.4, an abutting landowner is entitled 
to mailed notice if notice is otherwise provided by publishing or by posting; under section 
7That the change in structure and punctuation makes a difference in the substance 
of the provision is underscored by the recent change to section 72-3-108(2), Utah 
Legislature, so that it now provides: 
(2) A county may not vacate a county road unless notice of the hearing is: 
(a) published in a newspaper...; or 
(b) posted...; and 
(c) mailed to the department and all owners of property abutting the county 
road. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108(2) (Supp. 2000) (effective March 16, 2000). Thus, current 
law again requires that notice be mailed to the Department of Transportation and to 
abutting owners, in addition to notice either by publication or by posting. 
15 
72-3-108 as adopted in 1998, an abutting landowner is entitled to written notice only if 
notice is otherwise provided by posting. Representative Dillree was simply mistaken 
about the recodified provisions making no changes in the former law insofar as section 
27-12-102.4 was concerned. 
That mistake is understandable. When asked by Representative David L. Hogue at 
the third reading if she had gone through the bill with the interim committee page by 
page, Representative Dillree responded: 
We have gone through in the committee, the Department of 
Transportation reviewed, we had two of the counsel review. As far as every 
single page and cross- referencing it, I've read it but I haven't cross-
referenced it to ensure, but you know staff has done an outstanding job and 
I guess there is a certain level of trust there as we look at this. 
Remarks of Rep. Marda Dillree, Gen'l Session, 52nd Utah Leg., Jan. 22, 1998, tape 1, side 
2. Thus, it appears that Representative Dillree innocently relied on erroneous staff 
representations that her bill did not change prior substantive law. Because her statement 
is inconsistent with the statutory language of sections 27-12-102.4 and 72-3-108 
themselves, it should be given no weight in determining whether the former provision 
was intended by the legislature to have the same meaning as the latter. 
II. THE MATERIAL FACTUAL DISPUTE IN THE RECORD OVER 
WHETHER THE STATE IS AN OWNER OF LAND "ABUTTING" 
WEST STANSBURY ROAD PRECLUDES THIS COURT FROM 
MAIQNG THIS FINDING "AS A MATTER OF LAW" 
As the Court is well aware, summary judgment is appropriate only when there is 
no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
16 
Surety Underwriters v.E&C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, f 15; State ex rei Utah Air 
Quality Board v. Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 2000 UT 67, f 16; Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court must view the 
evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party and affirm only 
if there is no dispute as to a material fact or if, even accepting the facts as contended for 
by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Malone v. 
Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Cannon v. Travelers Indemnity, Inc., 2000 UT 
App824,Tf 14,994P.2d824. 
Appellees argue that this Court should affirm their summary judgment by 
determining "as a matter of law" that the State's sovereign lands do not "abut" the 
vacated public road. Br. of Tooele County at 3; Br. of Bleazards at 3, 20. This factual 
matter, however, cannot be decided on appeal as a matter of law. 
As they did below, appellees allege that the "public" road vacated by Tooele 
County stopped in the middle of section 16, Township 2 North, Range 6 West and did not 
continue north through section 9 to meet sovereign lands at the Great Salt Lake where the 
dike crosses sovereign lands to Badger Island. They supported this allegation with 
lengthy affidavits of the two Bleazard defendants (R. 171-80),8 maps, and records of 
8Appellees offer up the Tooele County Assessor's vague affidavit (R. 114; 
attached here as Addendum 1) as support, but it has no evidentiary value on the question 
of abuttingness. The assessor merely parrots the language of section 27-12-102.4, with 
the State plaintiff as the noun subject: "I have reviewed the records in my office, which 
indicate that in 1993 the State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not 
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numerous conveyances going back to 1948. (Defendants' Memorandum and Exhibits, R. 
257-307 & Exs. B-J). 
Judge Young ultimately determined that the fact of whether sovereign lands 
"abutted" the vacated road, one material to resolution of the State's motion, was disputed. 
(R. 355 at 42). A trial court's determination that there is a disputed issue of material fact 
is a legal determination reviewed for correctness. Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, ^ 2, 982 
P.2d 578. On this point, Judge Young was correct. 
Appellees cite only their own materials in the record supporting their contention 
that sovereign lands do not abut the vacated road. But these are controverted by the 
affidavit of the state employee responsible for sovereign lands in 1993 (R. 91) and the 
challenged Tooele County Ordinance itself (R. 81-83), as well as by the notice published 
in the newspaper (R. 94) regarding the petition to vacate and the hearing on it. These 
latter two items describe the vacated public road as extending all the way to a northern 
terminus at the Great Salt Lake in section 9, not as stopping in the middle of section 16, 
far from sovereign lands at the Great Salt Lake meander line, as appellees contend. See 
note I, supra. 
This dispute over the material fact of "abuttingness" precluded summary judgment 
an owner of property abutting the West Stansbury Island Road proposed for vacation." 
(R. 114). As the Division was not even created until after 1993, 1996 Utah Laws, ch. 
159, § 17 (effective July 1, 1996), this statement could be literally true, while saying 
nothing else definitive as a fact. Indeed, the assessor's statement appears to be an 
inappropriate conclusion of law based on unarticulated predicate facts. 
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for the State below. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co., 117> P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989). To award summary judgment to appellees, Judge Young had to have 
accepted the disputed fact as contended for by the losing party, the State -i.e., that 
sovereign lands do abut the vacated public road-and then determined that appellees were 
nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
On appellate review, this Court must do the same. See Malone, 826 P.2d at 133; 
Cannon, 2000 UT App 824, ^ f 14. Thus, the question of whether sovereign lands abut the 
vacated public road cannot be resolved in appellees' favor "as a matter of law" on appeal 
from the grant of summary judgment. See Schurtz v. BMW of North America, 814 P.2d 
1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). Moreover, the Court cannot affirm the summary judgment 
based on a fact that is disputed in the record. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 
(Utah 1998) (appellate court can affirm judgment on an alternative ground "if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record"); State v. Montoya, 937 
P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah App. 1997) (alternative ground is not "apparent on the record" 
unless record evidence is uncontroverted).9 Instead, this factual dispute must be litigated 
and resolved in the district court after reversal of the summary judgment and remand. 
9In the context of the "affirm on any ground" doctrine, "apparent on the record" 
means "more than mere assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the 'new' ground 
or theory. The record must contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the 
ground or theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing 
party may rely thereon on appeal." Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149-50. 
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III. THE STATE OF UTAH IS THE "OWNER OF RECORD" OF 
LANDS BELOW THE GREAT SALT LAKE MEANDER LINE 
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT THE RECORDS OF THE TOOELE 
COUNTY RECORDER AND ASSESSOR WOULD SHOW 
Judge Young's ruling that appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law was 
not based on any conclusion that the State is not "owner of record" of sovereign lands at 
the northern dead-end of West Stansbury Road. There is no evidence in the record 
establishing, as a factual matter, that the State is not "owner of record" of these sovereign 
lands. The county recorder's affidavit nearly parrots the statutory language and 
concludes: "I have reviewed the records in my office, which indicate that in 1993 the 
State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not an owner of property 
abutting the West Stansbury Island Road proposed for vacation." (R. 114).10 But it does 
not assert that the State is not an owner of record. The same is true of the assessor's 
affidavit: "I have reviewed the records and rolls in my office, which indicate that in 1993 
the State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not listed as a property 
owner on Stansbury Island, neither did it have a mailing address on the rolls of the county 
assessor."11 (R. 113, included here as Addendum 2). No assertion was made below that 
l0Even if this ambiguous statement were charitably interpreted as a sworn assertion 
that the State's ownership of sovereign lands is not noted in the plat maps prepared by the 
Tooele County Recorder, but see note 8 supra, there are other records kept by county 
recorders, such as the Miscellaneous Index, which might reflect that ownership. 
nThis allegation about the mailing address is controverted by the affidavit of the 
state employee responsible for sovereign lands in 1993 (R. 91). 
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the State is not an owner "of record," and the State has made no such admission on 
appeal. 
As Appellant argued in its opening brief, it is the recorder's duty to prepare 
accurate ownership plats that show "record owners" of each tract in the county and the 
assessor's duty to be fully acquainted with all property in the county. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 17-21-21, 22 (1999). But in any event, neither the contents nor the accuracy of 
the county officials' records is relevant to whether the State is the "owner of record" of 
sovereign lands around Stansbury Island. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
State held title to those sovereign lands as a matter of public record when the petition to 
vacate West Stansbury Road was considered.12 
"It is settled law in this country that lands underlying navigable waters within a 
state belong to the state in its sovereign capacity " United States v. Holt State Bank, 
270 U.S. 49, 54 (1926); accord State v. Rolio, 262 P. 987,989 (Utah 1927) (noting Utah 
took fee title to all such lands at statehood). With regard to lands below the Great Salt 
Lake's meander line in particular, fee title vested in the State of Utah in its sovereign 
capacity at the time of statehood in January 1896 by operation of law under the equal 
footing doctrine. Utah State Road Comm 'n v. Hardy Salt Co., 486 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 
12See Black's Law Dictionary 1131 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "record owner" as "a 
property owner in whose name the title appears in the public records"); Black's Law 
Dictionary 997 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "record owner," often used in tax notice statutes, 
as "owner of record" or "the owner of the title at time of notice"). 
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1971). The United States' challenge to that title was rejected by the Supreme Court when 
it affirmed the finding that the Great Salt Lake is navigable. See Utah v. United States, 
403 U.S. 9, 12-13(1971). 
As this Court has recognized, the State of Utah's ownership of lands below the 
water line of navigable lakes has been reflected in article XX of Utah's Constitution since 
statehood and in Utah's statutes since at least section 2325 of 1911 Utah Laws. Rolio, 
262 P. at 993. And, since at least 1988, Utah law has defined "sovereign lands" as "those 
lands lying below the ordinary high water mark of navigable bodies of water at the date of 
statehood and owned by the state by virtue of its sovereignty." Utah Code Ann. § 65A-1-
1(5) (2000). 
As this Court has also recognized, the State's title to sovereign lands is "not 
acquired by any express grant of Congress but by operation of law as an incident to the 
sovereignty of the State." Rolio, 262 P. at 989. The State accordingly has no document 
of title evidencing its ownership of sovereign lands and no deed, patent or other 
recordable instrument of conveyance.13 The recording statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-
102 and -103 (2000), simply have no application to sovereign lands, even if they require 
owners of nonsovereign lands to record their documents of title in order to defend their 
ownership against subsequent purchasers or to establish themselves as "owners of record" 
1
 Nonetheless, the fact that the State holds title to all lands below the meander line 
of the Great Salt Lake is noted in the side bar in the federal record maintained by the 
BLM for Stansbury Island (R. 119). 
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for other purposes. 
In short, the sovereign is not required to "record" its ownership of sovereign lands 
with each county recorder in order to be an "owner of record" of those lands. Instead, it 
is the "owner of record" of lands below the Great Salt Lake meander line, where the 
vacated West Stansbury Road ends, within the meaning of section 27-12-102.4 because 
its title as sovereign is reflected in the public records as a matter of federal and state law. 
This is so regardless of whether the Tooele County Recorder neglected to keep accurate 
county records of the ownership of those sovereign lands. 
Finally, the State agrees with the Bleazards that it would be unsound for a court to 
interpret section 27-12-102.4 as requiring mailed notice to an abutting landholder who 
was not the "owner of record." See Br. of Bleazards at 23-25. Indeed, such an 
interpretation would be untenable in light of the express language of the statute. See Br. 
of Appellant at 11-17, Point IA. But since the State is, as a matter of law, the "owner of 
record" of sovereign lands below the Great Salt Lake meander line, no such problem is 
presented here. 
Contrary to the Bleazards' desperate suggestion, id. at 24-25, there is no public 
policy or principle of statutory construction that would justify choosing a tortured 
construction of former section 27-12-102.4 merely to legalize past violation of its 
mandate in the instant case or to avoid hypothetical future litigation over any other such 
violations by county officials. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in its opening brief, the State of Utah, 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands asks the Court to reverse the summary 
judgment awarded defendants and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of February, 2001. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF CALLEEN PESHELL, TOOELE COUNTY RECORDER 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
Calleen Peshell, being first duly sworn, hereby states under oath as follows: 
1. I am the duly elected recorder of Tooele County. 
2. My office has the responsibility of recording all deeds to real property and 
preparing plat maps based thereon. 
3. I have reviewed the records in my office, which indicate that in 1993 the 
State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not an owner 
of property abutting the West Stansbury Island road proposed for vacation 
4. In 1993, the only owners of land abutting the road in question were the Six 
Mile Ranch Co. (LaVon Bleazard, owner), Craig S. Bleazard, Mark C 
Bleazard, John D. Bleazard, Rhea E. Castagno, Reese Richman, Robert 
Cook, United States of America (BLM), and Magnesium Corporation of 
America. 
DATED this ^1 day of September, 1999. 
Q?JL/luLf^4ZJL^JLUUU, 
Calleen Peshell, Tooele County Recorder 
Subscribed and sworn before me this .yj day of September, 1999, by Calleen 
Peshell. 
245 East Btoatom 
r;oele, Utah 5407* 
. - t a r 4, 2001 
• „ 3 of Utah 
ADDENDUM 2 
EXHIBIT 2 
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRIE PAYSTRUP, TOOELE COUNTY ASSESSOR 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
Jerrie Paystrup, being first duly sworn, hereby states under oath as follows: 
1. I am the duly elected assessor of Tooele County. 
2. My office has the responsibility of maintaining the tax assessment rolls 
pertaining to all real property in Tooele County. 
3. I have reviewed the records and rolls in my office, which indicate that in 1993 
the State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not listed as 
a property owner on Stansbury Island, neither did it have a mailing address on 
the rolls of the county assessor. 
DATED this J ^ d a y of September, 1999. 
Jerae Paystrup, Tooele Cdunty Assessor 
Subscribed and sworn before me this<^fe^aay of September, 1999, by Jerrie 
Paystrup. 
' ™ J ^ ~ * ~"Notary Public I 
/ £ % 2 ^ DEBORAH C.3AGERS , 
A A ^ ^ A ' 1 47 South Main • 
P Tooele Utah 84074 . 
rdy Ccamission Expres | 
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